Peter Andreas argues that the ambiguity of the numbers and potential for misleading interpretations is evident in the case of seizing and interdicting drugs at and beyond U.S. borders. The argument has been that larger and more frequent drug seizures are often presented as evidence of policy success, and lauded as a testament to more vigorous enforcement. But he claims that measuring interdiction “success” is politically tricky and can be very misleading and inaccurate. Why? Elaborate, and include some examples.
The UN/Palermo Convention on Transnational Organized Crime (specifically the Transnational Organized Crime definition) has been criticized for its vagueness. Referring to the actual UNTOC definition, please elaborate on why this might be the case. Why is it so difficult to develop a global definition of organized crime? Provide examples of the definition that remain very vague and hard to operationalize.
What are the main goals of criminal organizations (i.e., organized crime groups)? Continuity, profit or something else? And what variables differentiate criminal organizations from other types of lawless groups? Explain your views.
Would you agree that reports on transnational crime of various governmental and non-governmental organizations cannot be trusted because some of these organizations have a vested interest in the areas they observe and measure? Please explain and provide some real-life examples.
Discuss some recent studies on transnational/organized crime that have applied innovative and reliable approaches in an effort to measure, conceptualize and collect data on transnational crime. You can refer to Dugato, M., De Simonu, M. and Savona, E.U. (2014). Measuring OC in Latin America. Transcrime, but also to any other recent studies that use various data collections and measurement strategies in an effort to produce a more reliable transnational crime figures and reports.
