The Costly Signaling Model in Game Theory.
The question prompt is: Based on the materials from class (see attached below), how convincing do you find the evidence and arguments for the costly signaling model. What are the strengths and weaknesses of this evidence? To what degree are you convinced that this model explains an important component of human social behavior? What additional evidence (experimental, sociological, anthropological, etc) would be particularly helpful for evaluating this model? Aside from the documents provided (pls cite these, please find three additional sources to cite in answering the these questions as well). Please provide a reference page in the end. I have also attached another word document here called “discussions” is what the TA has said in our discussion board regarding the topic. Be sure to speak about the Nash Equilibrium and Proximate and Ultimate Explanations of thoughts and behaviors as these are recurrent themes in the class. I have attached a lecture slide on these. The writer might find these useful.
