Examine the causes and consequences of asymmetric information occurring between two parties in a given market? How can this problem be solved?
Literature review and project plan only
Additional references
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Bajari, Patrick, et al. “Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection, and Health Expenditures: a Semiparametric Analysis.” The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 45, no. 4, 2014, pp. 747–763. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/43186480.
Janssen, Maarten, and Santanu Roy. “On Durable Goods Markets with Entry and Adverse Selection.” The Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue Canadienne D’Economique, vol. 37, no. 3, 2004, pp. 552–589. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/3696006.
Holmstrom, B. (1979). Moral Hazard and Observability. The Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1), p.74.
Grossman, S. and Hart, O. (1983). An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem. Econometrica, 51(1), p.7.
Akerlof, G. (1970). The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(3), p.488.
Spence, M. (1973). Job Market Signaling. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87(3), p.355.
